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M A N S COSMIC TIES 
Within the Thought of Ramon Llull 
Both as the human being and as the philosopher that he was, Ramon 
Llull manifests in his writings an authentic concern for, and interest in, man. 
Chapters and whole sections within his large literary production were given to 
thoughtful reflections, intended often to encourage the reader to ponder se-
riously about the reality, nature and destiny of human beings, because of their 
unique and distinct character as rationally thinking persons. Indeed, soon af-
ter he completed his sixtieth year of age, Llull composed two books of mode-
rate length exclusively dedicated to giving a rather complete outline of his 
main penetrating thoughts on the nature of man taken in his totality and, in 
the earlier of the two works, on the nature of the innermost entitative princi-
ple within each human being. 1 As seen by Llull, as by a good many other phi-
losophers since the time of the great Greek philosophers, that inner principle 
is the specific factor that , withing man, accounts for his distinct rational and 
human character. Again since the time of those giants of Greece, the name by 
which it has best been known is " s o u l " . In a number of passages in the books 
to which we have alluded —they have these Latin titles: a) Liberde Ani/na Ra-
tionali and b) Liber de Homine— the author shows in unmistakable terms that 
he belongs to the great and venerable tradition of thinkers who have been con-
vinced of the truth of one rather important thing, namely, that we shall fail to 
recognize and to appreciate properly the true nature of man, as well as conse-
quentially his authentic ultimate destiny, so long as we look upon humans as if 
1. Both of these books, with the Latin titles of Liber de Anima Rationali and Liber de Homi-
ne may be read in MOG, VI, pp. 415-536. 
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they were practically independent and isolated entities that exist separately, 
with no meaningful ties and relations to the rest of the visible universe 
wherein, willy-nilly, they must live not just a part , but the whole, of their life 
from birth until death. Withing the philosophical tradition to which the philo-
sopher Llull belongs, well-nigh continuously the human person has rightly 
been viewed as truly a glorious microcosm, in which the larger and nearly 
boundless macrocosm outside of our consciousness is mirrored well and even 
substantially. 2 It is so because the reflection or mirroring is entitatively expres-
sed in the very substance and structure of our person. For this reason, the hu-
man person has often been pictured as a most important bridge wherein two 
well-nigh antithetical realms come together, meet and indeed unite in the rea-
lity of a substantially unified being: the realm of the purely spiritual and the 
world of physical reality. These two realms of being are actually united, 
strongly and intimately, in the twofold character of man ' s fundamental natu-
re, which is partly physical and visible and partly spiritual and invisible. It is 
proposed on the next few pages to indicate briefly the manner in which —very 
much in accord with the tradition to which he belongs but also in his own ori-
ginal style and way— Ramon Llull looked upon man . In concert with the tra-
dition he viewed man as: a) the being that more that any other being and in its 
own entitative structure, partakes of, and thus participates in the manifold 
perfections of the various major orders and species of created reality, and b) 
as the being that at the same time, because of, and in accord with, his physical 
and rational nature has been established as the effective means and instru-
ment, whereby all non-rational physical reality has received the effective capa-
city to realize the plan and destiny intended for it by the author of its being 
and of all being. 
We may well at the beginning note that it is a gcncrally recognized fact 
that thinkers who finished their work and writings long before —indeed, in 
the case of most , centuries before— the rise of Modern Philosophy had little 
occasion, or need, to explore explicitly, and at length, purely epistemological 
problems. It was so, not because they were altogether ignorant of such pro-
blems. Their writings frequently give evidence of a sufficiently conscious and 
critical, albeit understandably incipient, epistemological posture. In the case 
of nearly all of them, one must reckon with a sound and reflective moderate 
intellectual realism. As a result, they accepted and defended the value and re-
lative effectiveness of man ' s twofold way of knowing: initially but incomple-
tely, by way of the important sensory powers which man has in common with 
irrational animals; and secondly, more perfectly and fully, by way of an 
authentic understanding and the power of reasoning. Ramon Llull, the thirteenth 
2. With very good reason Robert Pring-Mill could give to one of his short treatises on Llull's 
understanding of man the title of El Mkrocosmos Lul.lid. Palma de Mallorca, Editorial Moll. 1961. 
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century philosopher born at Majorca, 3 Spain, was no exception on this impor-
tant matter if one is to establish the edifice of human knowledge on a sound 
foundation, and in the interest of objective t ruth. Like most of his philosophi-
cal predecessors, regardless of whether Christian, Mohammedan or Jewish, in 
a spirit that goes back to Aristotle and Pla to , the Majorcan philosopher exhi-
bits constantly in his many writings, a realistically rational confidence in the 
basic effectiveness, objectivity and reliability of man 's natural cognitive po-
wers, powers wherewith nature has equipped the members of the human spe-
cies so that they are truly able to know. For rather obvious reasons linked con-
sistently with his noetic realism, Llull experienced no necessity —nor did he 
detect the slightest reason— to require from philosophically oriented persons 
any kind of strict Aristotelian demonstrat ions, with which to ascertain with 
absolute certainty our knowledge about the reality of the extramental physical 
world. Even less did he see, within his realism, any need to prove at the same 
time the objective existence of the self that is ourselves, in the case of each one 
of us . This existence is of course, verified by, and in, the distinct conscious-
ness that we have of ourselves. That either both, or at least one, of these de-
monstrat ions is a task that , sooner or later, has to be at tempted, if a thinker is 
to be, and to continue to be, rationally certain of the existence of the world 
and of ourselves, is something that has been repeatedly suggested by many a 
subjectivist thinker who has followed, or come after, the famous Cartesian re-
volut ion. 4 It is a well known fact that Rene Descartes initiated this revolution 
with his unsuccessful efforts to develop at least one demonstrative proof of 
the extramental existence of the physical world, about which of course, he 
knew, or had some idea of, in the interior of his mind. Let it suffice to recall 
that Descartes began his demostration of the world after acknowledging his 
unshakable certainty concerning the fact of his existence. Such is undoubtedly 
the meaning of the Cartesian cogito ergo sum. 
In a doubtlessly different, indeed opposite, fashion Ramon Llull initiated 
his philosophising with a staunch and well founded conviction of both his own 
existence and of the reality of the large number of physical entities or substan-
ces, of which he knew by experience and of which we speak collectively as the 
world of experience. Moreover, it must be clearly stated that his certainty and 
conviction in either or both instances were not rooted in, nor due to , some im-
possible rational and mediate demonstration of the existence of either. Nor 
were they on the other hand, simply established on the basis of a non-rational 
and unquestioning faith, of whatever kind and source. Rather on the contrary 
and clearly, the rational basis that in both instances has to be given is what we 
3. LlulFs years of birth and death are not known with exactness, Hc was born in one of the 
years between 1232 and 1235. The year of his death was almost ccrtainly 1316. 
4. Cf. Joseph PEIFER, The Mystery of Knowledge, Albany, Magi Books, 1952, pp. 12-28. 
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rightly term " immedia te and direct experience". Thus in the case first, of the 
material things all a round us it cannot be rationally denied that we have, or 
can easily have, some direct experience in many instances. We have just 
recalled that it is of the innumerable kinds and instances of such material 
substances that we speak as " t h e wor ld" . We do not mean, of course, to ex-
clude ourselves for we are likewise possessed of an extended and physical 
body, which we can observe in our own case and in that of others. Manifestly 
thinking of such a material universe of ours , Llull wrote: 
Through experience we know that corporeal substances exist, because we see them 
by seeing, by feeling, and by way of the other senses. Such is the case for example, 
of a stone that is both visible and tangible. Likewise with other substances. 5 
In a comparable fashion and regarding our own separate individual exis-
tence, it can be rationally said that we are as equally certain, if not more so, at 
least if we speak within a psychological framework. Again, our existence and 
being are not facts demonstrable in terms of previously established and better 
known premises, of whose truth we have higher degree of certainty. Nor again 
are we certain of either of them on the other hand, as a result of a certainty 
rooted in a sort of a crudely non-rational and animal evidence or in a kind of 
unquestioning faith, one that calls for no explanations at all. Undoubtedly, 
the reason is that each one of us comes by that certainty on the basis of, or be-
cause of, an immediate contact with, and experience of, ourselves, in at least 
some obscure fashion. More correctly, it may be said that each one of us has 
an immediate and direct experience of the many acts, both of a sensory and a 
non-sensory character, that emanate or proceed from ourselves, as from their 
subject and their source. It is a manifest fact that the consciousness of such 
acts of ours , in many ways, is something that nonc of us can rationally deny. 
In one of the earliest and most extensive books —in content and in size— 
which came from the pen of Ramon Llull, and that he wrote originally in his 
native Catalan language, the author meditated in this fashion: " a n d for that 
reason, merciful Lord, since I have the true knowledge that I am in being, and 
since I see that my being is not in a condition of privation, either in a small or 
large quan t i t y . . . " 6 . 
In a manner borne out by experience, the undeniable and conscious cer-
tainty that each one of us has regarding the truth and the fact of his or her 
5. "Per experientiam scimus, quod sint corporales substantiae, quia ipsas sentimus per videre 
et tangere et per alios sensus: sicut lapis, qui est visibilis et tangibilis, et sic de aliis substantiis." 
Ram6n Llull, Liber de Anima Rationali, pars 1, (MOG VI, p. 417). 
6. "E per ass6, Senyer misericordi6s, com sapia jo per veritat que son en esser, e veg que mon 
esser no es privat poc ni molt . . ." Ramon Llull, Libre de Contemplacid en Deu, c. 2, 3, (ORL, II p. 
11). The Latin version of the Liber Contemplationis in Deum may be consulted in MOG IX -X. 
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own existence is linked to the distinctly cognitive character of the external sen-
ses, and more significatly of course, to our contact by means of them with the 
world of bodies, outside of our minds. In the actual moment when a person 
experiences the reality of the objects external to his or her mind, and that by 
way of his or her body and senses, he or she is aware, at least obscurely, that it 
is he or she who is, at that precise moment , the underlying but existing subject 
of the experiences of which he or she is aware . 7 Without question, it is because 
he thus understood the situation that the philosopher Llull wrote, only a few 
Hnes prior to the last quoted passage: 
In consequence, those of us who are established in the certainty that we are in exis-
tence ought to rejoice, because the five senses manifest to us clearly the being with 
which we find ourselves. For with the eyes we see, with the ears we hear, with the 
nose we smell, with the mouth we taste, and with the flesh we feel . 8 
A characteristic trait of thinkers in the moderate intellectual realist tradi-
tion —not exclusively, but shared by others in some instances of course— is 
their metaphysical optimism. In accord with such an optimism, they value 
well and appeciate deeply the basic worth and almost tangible goodness that 
are proper to the perfections of existence and of being, in their manifold and 
varied manifestat ions. 9 Practically every line of the second chapter of the phi-
losopher 's single quoted book thus far, in which he expresses joy over the fact 
of his own existence —as well as a number of chapters which follow later and 
exalt over the existence of a) fellow humans , and b) of the many other kinds of 
created being— prove beyond doubt how true to the character of a metaphysi-
cal optimist Ramon Llull was. Time and time again, he reiterates the thought 
that neither one 's own existence nor that of fellow human beings —and it is a 
fact " t ha t we see that there are many men in existence"" 1— ought to be viewed 
as either an absurdity or an evil, in a totally incomprehensible and meanin-
gless universe. Such has been, as we know, the opinion expressed by a few 
twentieth century atheistic existentialist th inkers ." Contrariwise and rather 
than putting forward suggestions that other men are like hell and a source of 
mi se ry a n d u n h a p p i n e s s to the s i n g u l a r l y free a n d a u t h e n t i c 
7. See Peifer, op. cit., pp. 33 and 43. 
8. "Donc nos, qui som certificats que som en esser, alegrar nos em, car los .v. senys mostren 
1'esser en que som: car ab los ulls veem, e ab les orelles oym, e ab lo nas odoram, e ab la boca gus-
tam, e ab la carn sentim." Llull, Libre de Contemplacid, c. 2, 1 (ORL, II, p. 11). 
9. Cf. Joseph OWENS, An Elementary Christian Metaphysics. Milwaukee, The Bruce Pu-
blishing Co. , 1963, p. 120. Also Kenneth DOUGHERTY, GeneralEthics. Peekskill, N.Y. , Gray-
moor Press, 1959, pp. 27, 29. 
10. "On, con nos, Senyer, vejam molts homens esser en esser." Llull, Libre de Contempla-
cid, c. 3, 8, (ORL, II, pp. 15-16). 
11. Dougherty, op. cit., p. 30. Cf. Harry R. KLOCKER. Thomism and Modern Thought, 
New York, Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1962, pp. 189/90. 
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person that each one of us is, Llull asserts with pride that "every one ought 
thus to rejoice on account of the being of his neighbor as well as on account of 
his very o w n " . 1 2 And as for one 's own existence he declares: "Each man 
ought to rejoice exceedingly for the reason that he finds himself in being and 
because he is not deprived of that b e i n g . " 1 3 How could the philosopher think 
otherwise, since he recognized the universality of the links between being and 
metaphysical goodness? Those links safeguard the objective validity of a me-
taphysical principle, a universal law of reality and being, according to which 
being, goodness and perfection accompany each other always and go hand in 
hand, as it were, in a right measure and the proper p ropor t ion , 1 4 with the ne-
cessary result that the higher and more we have of the one in a given instance, 
the higher and more do we have of the others. One may ask moreover, who 
can be ignorant of the fact also that so many good things are either simply 
possible, or actually come to us only after, and because, we possess existence? 
If we but think of this, then we shall have to agree that it is manifest and cer-
tain that " i t is by far exceedingly better for us to be in existence than it would 
be if we were not in b e i n g . " 1 5 It is of interest to note in passing, that in several 
at tempts to establish rationally the existence of a Supreme and Divine Being 
which are developed, and in some instances only outlined, in several of his 
works, Llull makes use persuasively and frequently of the principle that ex-
presses unambiguously the necessary links which the philosopher could not 
but detect between being, goodness and perfection on the one hand, and non-
being, evil and imperfection or defect on the o the r . 1 6 
The keen and certain realization that every person cannot but have of his 
own existence and of that of the many other members of the same human spe-
cies with whom he comes into daily contact does not entail of course, either a 
necessary or a factually clear and distinct understanding and knowledge of 
what we are fundamentally, of what interiorly, within ourselves, constitutes 
the kind of being that we are. It is only after we have at least grown beyond 
the early years of our lives and begun, of a set purpose, to turn our attention 
to our own selves, that we begin to have more than a rather obscure awareness 
12. "Conv'en-se que cascu de nos que'ns alegrem los uns ab los altres enfre nos meteis; car 
axis deu cascii alegrar en lo esser de son proixme com es en lo seu metex". Llull, Libre de Contem-
placid, c. 3, 1, (ORL, II, p. 15). 
13. ".. .car molt se deu alegrar l'ome per so com es en esser, e no es privat de esser". Ibid., c. 
2, 1, (ORL, II, p. 11). 
14. "Entellectualment es certificat e demostral e significat que esser ha concordansa e acosta-
ment ab acabament e non esser ab defall iment. . ." Llull, Ibid., c. 227, 16, (ORL, VI, p. 8). 
15. "Car si he aquesta ymaginacib, jo trobare que mellor m'es esser que si no era en esser". 
Ibid., c. 2, 19, (ORL, II, p. 13). 
16. See for example the proofs in book 1 of Llull's Liber de Gentili et Tribus Sapientibus, c. 
1, (MOG, pp. 26-38). For the original Catalan version of libre de Gentil e los Tres Savis see Ra-
m6n Llull. Obres Essencials. Barcelona, Editorial Selecta, 1957. Vol. 1, pp. 1057-1142. 
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of what precisely human beings are as such, of what withing themselves makes 
them be what they are. It is only then also that we begin to do more than 
simply suspect the nature of our tasks and goals vis-a-vis and in contrast to the 
many other kinds of entities discovered in the world wherein we find our-
selves. Moreover, as most of us sooner or later learns, the knowledge of these 
significant matters is acquired by us rather slowly, gradually and only with 
and after a distinct amount of time and effort on our part . But undoubtedly, 
after we arrive at the realization of how things stand with man, we may then, 
with understanding and without hesitation, probably agree that , given the im-
portance of the questions at issue, the acquiring of such knowledge is a thing 
that a person with talent, the oportunity and the time to pursue it ought to do 
as energetically as he can, certainly for one 's own enlightenment first, but also 
that of others as well. It should occasion but very little surprise that our Ma-
jorcan philosopher of more than six centuries ago should have seen things in 
this light, as many others of course, have done before, as well as after him. 
Thus , he recommended to his readers as a most fitting task that each one learn 
well what it is that " m a n is, because he is a m a n . " 1 7 Profound consequences 
follow from the possession of the knowledge of what human beings are basi-
cally, of what one is as a man . For it is only with this knowledge that a person 
can properly love himself well; and only with such knowledge again, will the 
same person be in readiness to apply himself to learning and acquiring the 
knowledge, with clarity, of what things and actions he ought to carry out or 
avoid, in order to insure success at the task of realizing his human character, 
rightly and adequately. 1 8 A reflective man is well aware that , in most instan-
ces, such vital knowledge does not come to us overnight, without at least a 
moderate amount of effort. Part of the reason why it is so is that men are not 
simply what they appear and are exteriorly. Even before one goes about 
searching for the desired knowledge, one begins to suspect at least that there is 
a great deal more to what man is, precisely in his character of simply a human 
being. It is undoubtedly and obviously so, because man is not simply, or just, 
the visible physical part of his being which anyone can observe, although ma-
terialists of all sorts, throuhgout the centuries, would have it so. Man is like-
wise, and most importantly so, an invisible part , the element or principle 
within him which philosophers, since the time of the Greeks, have identified 
as the lifegiving interior source, that in addition, in the case of ourselves, gives 
each one his specific and distinct human character, as a member of the human 
species. Traditionally and again since the time of the Greek philosophers, this 
17. "Cum sit conveniens, quod homo sciat: quid sit homo, postquam est homo" . Ram6n 
Llull, Liber de Homine, prol. (MOG, VI, p. 475). 
18. Loc. cit. 
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inner life-source or principle within the interior of all living things has been 
known as " t h e s o u l " , 1 9 which, in the case of man , has been generally con-
ceived as rational and spir i tual . 2 0 We cannot , and ought not to , overlook the 
historical fact that there have always been a few men who have been and con-
tinue to be ignorant of its existence and nature, basically for the reason that 
" the rational soul is an invisible s o u l " . 2 1 But sadly, in the predictable conse-
quence of their ignorance of that which within themselves constitutes their in-
nermost self, as it were, those men cannot properly order their lives towards 
the end of all ends for man as m a n , 2 2 the absolutely ultimate and principal end 
that belongs to man in virtue of his nature and which he should make his own 
consciously and freely, because of his exclusive posscssion of a rational and 
spiritual soul. It was in part due to reflections on the ignorance, on the part of 
many men, of things of utmost importance in the end, that led Llull, as they 
have led other men, to engage in and write with care, philosophically of 
course, on the subject of man and his soul. For that reason, as indicated abo-
ve, the philosopher completed a philosophical treatise entitled A Book on the 
Rationat Soul in 1294, shortly after he had reached his sixtieth year. Six years 
later he followed with a second anthropological treatise and gave to it the phi-
losophically familiar title of A Book on Man. And it need not be said in so 
many words that the Illuminated Doctor —applying to him an honored title 
bestowed by posterity on Ramon Llull— had not waited until such late years 
to write on the subject, penetratingly and well. For already in the early years 
of a prolific literary career, as well as later, he found repeated occasions in his 
writings to reflect on the many questions that touch on the basic nature and 
character of man . That he did so the reader can easily ascertain with just a few 
glances at the many chapters and sections which the author set aside for 
themes relating to man, for example, in the Book of Contemplation, in Felix 
or the Book of Marvels and in the Tree of Science.2-
Consistently and understandably, LlulFs grasp of the basic structure and 
character of human nature provided him with a solid basis and a source for 
many of the reasons he appealed to, as worthy occasions for the experience by 
19. James E. ROYCE. Man andMeaning. New York, McGraw-Hill, 1969, p. 38. Also H. D. 
GARDEIL. Introduction to the Philosophy o/St. Thomas Aquinas, III Psychologv. Tr. John A. 
Otto, St. Louis, B. Herder Book Co. , 1963, pp. 24-35. 
20. GARDEIL, op. cil., p. 224. 
21. "Quoniam anima rationalis est substantia invisibilis, sunt multi homincs, qui de illa non 
habent cognil ionem", Ramon Llull, Liber de Anima Rationali, prol. (MOG, VI, p. 415). 
22. Loc. cit. 
23. The reader is referred particularly to chaptcrs 103-226 in the Libre de Contemplacid; to 
the eighth book (chapters 44-115) of Libre de Meravelles, OE I, 389-498, and to the fifth parl or 
"tree" of the Arbre de Ciencia, OE 1, 616-635. 
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men of a genuine gladness over the fact a) of our existence and b) of our fe-
llow human beings. Repeatedly, he would rightly reiterate the thought that Ihe 
members of the human species are not only the extended and physical aspect 
that anyone can readily discover, both in himself and in others. This aspect is 
certainly, but only in part , constitutive of a human person. Men discover so 
initially, and afterwards of course, by means of the cognitive instruments 
which are our eyes and other parts or organs, intimately linked with our exter-
nal senses. That men do so, Llull recognized realistically, naturally and hap-
pily, for he knew well that those organs of the body, and the senses which they 
serve as instruments, are an important and indispensable part of the normal 
equipment granted by nature to man and animals. And of course, he also 
acknowledged readily that each man is, in part , the visible and natural body 
that we say he possesses. In a sound and realistic fashion, he could not view 
the human, in the case of each man, except as an essential constitutive part of 
the whole and single reality that each person is. However at the same time, he 
could not but also realize the truth that a human person is not exclusively his 
extended body, although it clearly belongs, truly and fundamentally, to the 
person whose body it is. Indeed, in a real sense, it is that person, but only par-
tially. But neither is man to be conceived on t h e o t h e r hand, as just a sort of 
an ethereal, invisible and spiritual substance of an exclusively immaterial na-
ture that people have chosen arbitrarily to call by the name of " s o u l " or "spi-
r i t " . This again notwithstanding that the philosopher will rightly insist, with 
others, that in this invisible and spiritual element we have come across the su-
perior and, by far, the more important constituent part of the basic nature of 
man. This has to be maintained for it is precisely the spiritual soul, within 
each living person, that ultimately and fundamentally established him as the 
kind of being that he is, a human being and person. 
If one expects to understand man correctly and adequately however, one 
needs to proceed still a step further. For one must also deny with the philoso-
pher from Majorca, a third distinct understanding of the nature of man that 
has at times been presented. From the philosopher 's writings we gather expli-
citly that it is false and incorrect to view man as nothing more than a very clo-
sely knit union or juxtaposition of two distinct and heterogeneous substances, 
with nothing in common more than their accidental union in an externally uni-
fied being. For rather than a single being that is radically one, this supposedly 
unified being but simply externally or accidentally, is and continues to be all 
along, despite its supposedly closely knit union, two distinct entities or subs-
tances, which somehow, as a result of that external union, we are accustomed 
to think of, and to speak of, as " m a n " . 
Together with most of the outstanding schoolmen of the two centuries 
within which his life was spent, Llull valiantly taught and upheld the doctrine, 
or theory, that has it that each human being is truly a single being each time, 
granting of course his composite nature for the reason that " m a n is a 
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substance made up of a rational soul and a b o d y " . 2 4 According to LlulFs 
thought and quite clearly, man is, manifestly and experientially, a single 
substance with a composite nature , whose constitutive principles are ama-
zingly but yet substantially unified. Therefore, it is wrong to think of man as 
if he were two simply juxtaposed, or conjoined, separate entities that almost 
just happen to be together in that their bonds are totally external, superficial, 
accidental and consequently for a relatively short t ime. Undoubtedly as repea-
ted before, man is partially and significantly the extended portion of his 
being. Of it we simply speak as "h is b o d y " . We must also admit that man is 
partially, or has, a spiritual soul which is invisible and different than the body. 
As present within a human being however, these two indispensable and essen-
tial component principles are not separate and complete substances, each dis-
tinct and apart from the other. Quite the contrary. Both, the soul and the 
body, or better the principles of which we speak as such, are and continue to 
be the two essential, but incomplete, constitutive elements that together make 
up the one whole composite reality we have in each single person. With such 
an understanding of man , the philosopher can state: 
The soul is likewise within a man, insofar as it is a part of the man. But the man is 
his own complete whole. In a similar manner, the soul is in the body of a man, and 
the man's body in the soul: as two parts whereof each part of the whole is in the 
other, in order that a complete whole be g iven . 2 5 
The explanation of the profound union that we have in the case of man , 
—as well as analogously in the case of other substantial compositions and 
unions— lies in the fact that we have, on the part of each rational soul, a subs-
tantial form or principle, which as such informs the body within which it is 
present as its substantial form. The result of so intimate and radical a union, 
between a rational soul and the body it informs, is that together they establish, 
in a substantial union, the single existing reality, one in substance, that is each 
person or human being. From such an understanding of man it follows ob-
viously, as a necessary consequence, that an individual human being ceases to 
be a human being as soon as " h e ceases to be because of the separation of the 
p a r t s " . 2 6 Contrariwise also, a given reality in the world "cont inues to be a 
man through the composition and the p rop inqu i ty" 2 7 of the two parts known 
24. "homo est substantia constituta ex anima rationali et corpore elementato, vegetato, sen-
sato et imaginato". Llull, Liber de Homine, part 3, (MOG, VI, p. 484). 
25. "Anima est etiam in homine, in quantum est pars hominis, et homo est suum totum. Item 
anima est in corpore hominis, et corpus hominis in anima, sicut duae partes, quarum una pars 
totius est in alia, ut ex ambabus sit totum compositum; et quia homo est compositus ex anima et 
corpore, ideo . . ." Ibid., p. 482. 
26. "Et quando contingit, quod homo non sit homo, ipse desinit esse propter separationem 
suarum partium". Ibid., p. 484. 
27. ". . .s ic homo est homo et perseverat esse homo per compositionem et propinquitatem 
suarum partium". Loc. cil. 
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as the body and the soul. Obviously therefore, the coming together, and, more 
precisely, the ensuing substantial union, of those two essential principles re-
sults each time in a single human being, a man that is, or "one who conse-
quently passes into, or is in a third number , and who is a simple whole in the 
number (i.e. species) of man, according to the latter 's definition, and whose 
parts are his common form, his common matter and his commont a c t " . 2 8 
Another consequence that follows is " tha t man stands above, whereas his 
gross and lesser parts stand beneath, under man that i s " . 2 9 
Up to this point we have recalled how, in the thought of the Illuminated 
Doctor, each human person possesses a spiritual rational soul. The person is 
thereby fundamentally constituted as what he is, not wholly but only in part . 
But the soul is substantially united, in the most intimate and natural manner 
possible, therefore, with a distinct natural and extended body which is the se-
cond constitutive part of man . We ought to look upon the soul therefore, as 
clearly the actual and substantial principle that , as a substantial form, informs 
from within a particular natural body. This body in its turn, and in the act of 
so being informed, is given, and acquires, its distinct human character or con-
dition, and consequentially its perfection as the human body that it then beco-
mes and i s 3 0 . That something of ourselves, of which we speak as our body, 
—and indeed every distinguishable particle of it, so long as it remains a part 
united with that body— takes on its precise human character and perfection, 
because, and to the extent that , it and those particles are made human by the 
informing rational soul . 3 1 But we know on the other hand, that it ought not to 
be forgotten that it is because, and only so long as, the soul is actually united 
with the body whose form it is, that there is given in actual reality an existent, 
unified and single being that is recognized as a human being and person. 
At this juncture we have arrived at a point and position where it is possi-
ble to develop explicitly, albeit somewhat briefly, the themes intimated in the 
title of this paper. For on the basis of what has been recalled, it can be added 
and understood well that it is precisely by reason of the substantial bonds 
which unite, in the reality of a single human being, a single rational soul and 
28. ". . .ex quarum conjuntione resultat homo, qui transit et est in tertio numero, et est totum 
simplex in numero hominis secundum suam definitionem, et suae partes sunt sua communis for-
ma et sua communis materia, et earum communis actus . . ." Ibid., p. 485. 
29. "Et sic est homo superius, et suae partes grossae et minutae sunt inferius, hoc est, sub ho-
mine . . ." Loc. cit. 
30. "Anima rationalis est illa forma, quae informat corpus ad vivendum: et ipsum iacit esse 
in humana specie". Ibid., p. 479. 
31. "Anima rationalis est illa res, quae, quando est disjuncta et separata a corpore, tunc cor-
pus perdit illam figuram, quam habuit, quando erat conjunctum cum anima.. . et remanet defor-
matum et denudatum a sua viva forma...; quia suae partes non tendunt ad finem humani esse, ad 
quem tendebant, dum corpus erat conjunctum cum anima. . ." Loc. cit. 
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its naturally assigned or appropriated body —the latter undeniably, one of the 
admittedly innumerable material and extended substances in the world that we 
likewise inhabit— that we are authorized, in an accurate fashion, to look 
upon man in the manner suggested in the title of the paper. We are in other 
words, more than sufficiently justified if we consider man as the actual or real 
entity which, in the scheme of things as they are in nature , unites in the struc-
ture, or make up , of its own substance and being the principal perfections of 
all the major divisions and orders of created being. On the basis of that 
thought , it can well be said with our philosopher, that man participates in all 
of the distinct orders of created being, and that he does so indeed, in a unique 
way not found with any other created being. The case is so, it may be explai-
ned specifically, because through, and in, the reality of their physical or natu-
ral bodies men have so much in common with all the different orders of mate-
rial being. The essential perfections that make for physical being, for life and 
for sentient or animal reality are found present and harmoniously united 
within the entitative structure of the human body, and although the perfec-
tions do not give that body its human perfection and character, they truly 
belong to the constitution of its nature part ial ly. 3 2 For that reason they esta-
blish a sort of ontological kinship between man on the one hand, and the three 
other major orders of created being in the physical universe on the other, with 
all the species under those three distinct orders. Accordingly, it is legitimate to 
assert on those grounds that man has a part in, that he participates in, all of 
the distinguishable orders of observable being in the material universe, of 
which man himself is obviously a small part , if we consider only the texture 
and size of his physical makeup . Surrounding him, man obviously finds in his 
immediate vicinity, on the earth he inhabits, a multitude of differents kinds of 
inanimate objects, of minerals, of living plants and of many species of irratio-
nal animals. About all of them man knows from experience as he lives his life 
on this planet. It suffices that man gaze up into the heavens to discover every 
day there, more and more of the myriads of celestial bodies, some of which 
are named planets, others their satellites and still most of them the stars in all 
their groupings, or the thousands upon thousands of constellations which ap-
pear to crowd the heavens, to the very ends of a seemingly limitless universe. 
To all of these various kinds of material beings, upon the earth and in the heavens 
above, man is related in virtue of a kinship brought about by and in the entitative 
makeup or character of the physical part of his being, known as a man's body. At 
the same time, by reason of the invisible spark within him that is his rational soul, 
the same human being reaches out to beyond the realm of physical reality. In vir-
tue of his spiritual soul man also unites within himself and, in a meaningful 
32. Llull, Ibid., part 1, (MOG, VI, pp. 476-478). 
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measure, partakes of the conditions and perfections of the spiritual segment 
within the totality of reality. At the same time however, the rational soul, by 
reason of its continued natural and substantial union with the body whose 
form it is, making it human —a union which can, and will sooner or later, be 
temporarily broken by death— as well as the whole and distinct human being 
that arises each time out of that substantial union, may rightly be seen as ha-
ving an authentic share in, or part of, the perfection of all corporeal substan-
ces. With good reason may a thinker propose and defend that the rational soul 
of each human because of, and in, its union "with a human body has a share 
with a larger number of creatures than any other subs tance" . 3 3 This is said of 
course, mainly in reference to created material beings. To it we need to add 
something already pointed out, namely that by reason of the invisible part of 
his being, the spiritual soul —and it is the soul which makes of itself and of the 
body in union with it a particular person, a particular human being— man has 
a distinctly definite participation in the perfections and consequently, in the 
orders of created being entitatively higher than himself. To such superior 
beings we ordinarily refer as " ange l s " and " sp i r i t s " . In virtue of the presence 
within him of a rational soul which gives him the distinct human character, 
man has acquired a likeness to angelic spirits, partially of course. This likeness 
is specifically given in the spiritual character of the nature of the soul and in its 
consequent, but essential, endowment of three distinct intellectual or rational 
powers. These three powers enable man to carry on the specifically distinct in-
tellectual activities of true remembrance, rational understanding and spiritual 
love. From the possession of a partially spiritual nature that now belongs to 
man because of his spiritual soul with is intellectual powers, a philosopher can 
infer and conclude rationally that the human body has also, in some way, re-
ceived the capacity for an endlessly lasting existence, interrupted obviously by 
the undoubted occurrence of death, sooner or later. Such a thought ob-
viously, does in no way contravene or oppose what was established before, na-
mely that , precisely because of its substantial union with a physical body, the 
soul itself, and with it the whole man — who is none other than the soul and 
body in their substantial union— may properly be said to have an entitative 
share, to participate through its very substance and reality, in the perfections 
of the various orders of bodily or physical substances in existence. And it can 
be shown to be so 
"because that body has a share in the heavens, to the extent that it is a receiver of 
their influences and because it is one with them is species, namely, that of body. It 
participates in the four elements because it is made up of all four. Likewise it has a 
33. "Anima stans conjuncta cum humano corpore, est substantia, quae participat cum pluri-
bus creaturis, quam ulla alia substantia". Llull, Liber de Anima, part 2, (MOG, VI, p. 425). 
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share in plants since it also includes a vegetative nature within its makeup. Likewi-
se it distinctly participates in the sentient world because it is also made up from it. 
Lastly, the same also holds in regard to the nature with possession of the power of 
the imaginat ion". 3 4 
What is known of man ' s participation in the perfections of particulary 
the various kinds of beings that possess a physical nature , at least partially, 
brings us to a good position to proceed, with understanding, on to the next 
idea which logically follows from that participation. For on the basis of what 
has been established regarding the participation by man , through the instru-
mentality of the corporeal component part of his nature and being, in the rea-
lity and perfections of the various orders of physical reality, the philosopher 
can move on to present the human person as a being wonderfully and well 
adapted to occupy, and in a sense to be, the very center of the universe of 
physical reality. But more importantly and for the same reasons, the human 
person is established by reason of the entitative texture of his own substances 
as the bridge, or perhaps better, as the appropriate means or instrument 
whereby all corporeal nonrational substances now have the effective capacity 
to arrive at their unconditionally highest and ultimate destination, and to 
achive thus the principal goal because of which they have all been placed in the 
realm of existence. This absolute and final end is for them a natural end 
which, as such, has been assigned to them by the only one who could have 
done so, the Author of their nature specifically, and of nature as a whole. The 
author in question can rationally be shown to be one with the supremely Per-
fect and First Being, whom the ordinary language of religion names " G o d " . 
In complete accord with the understanding of the majority of or thodox 
theistic thinkers —amongst whom Llull ought to be included without reserva-
tions or questions— we may speak of the ontologically First Being as the 
Highest or Supreme Good, or literally also as the Infinite Good. For that rea-
son precisely, because within His own being He embodies, indeed is, the essen-
ce and totality of goodness itself, the creative First Being neither could nor can 
ever assign to any of his creations, or creatures, an absolute ultimate end other 
than Himself, in at least some way. In speaking about these matters , a thinker 
has to agree that the supremely Perfect Being has established and given Him-
self to all created beings as their highest principal end, without the exclusion 
34. "Nam illud corpus participat cum firmamento, in quantum ab illo accipit influentiam, et 
est cum illo in una specie, quae est corpus; et participat cum quatuor elementis, quia ipsum est de 
omnibus quatuor; et participat cum plantis, quia ipsum est dc vegetativa; et participat cum scnsi-
tiva, in quantum est de illa; et hoc idem de imaginativa". Loc. cit. For a bricf account of how 
within the human body are harmoniously united the four distinct levels of physical nature, below 
the properly human or rational level of nature which is recognized as spiritual, see LlulTs Liber de 
Homine, part 1, (MOG, VI, p. 476-478). And for a longer treatment of each level separately, see 
the first four "trees" of LlullVs Arbre de Ciencia in OE, I, pp. 556-616. 
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of even one of any of the so-called nonrational substances, to which we may 
refer simply as purely physical beings or things. But even such unthinking and 
posibly lifeless substances, as well as other non-rational material entities, have 
the Highest Good as their ultimate end we must acknowledge. 3 5 It is so, becau-
se " G o d has created them principally for Himself, so that their end might be 
n o b l e r " . 3 6 Had the First Being assigned or given to any creature an absolutely 
ultimate end other than the Highest Good, Himself, He would have been 
guilty of a wrong and injustice incompatible with one who is the supremely 
Perfect G o o d . 3 7 In so doing He would have preferred the lesser finite good 
over the Infinite Good, a preference and a choice indicative, not of power, 
wisdom and perfection, but of a defect or deficiency and of a lack of wisdom 
and perfection, totally absent from the Highest and Infinite Good. 
A moderate measure of reflection is all that is requisite in order to realize 
that , simply on account of their non-rational nature and condition, purely 
corporeal and, consequentially, totally corruptible entities —in whose number 
one must include all things material in some fashion, with the exception of 
men possessed of a rational soul— are totally incapable of, and in, themselves 
achieving and bringing to realization their highest goal, in a manner which we 
may describe as rationally permanent, conscious, and free. They cannot them-
selves directly arrive at their highest end, and satisfy the ultimate reason, goal 
and intention on account of and for the sake of which they have received, in 
the last analysis, both the existence and the nature which are theirs, as the 
things and kind of things they are. However and as Llull reiterated several 
times, it is possible to determine rationally that to every created being the 
Highest Good has been assigned as its ultimate end. It can also be determined 
that this is and has to be an achievable end. Were it not an achievable end, 
then the Author of all nature and being would manifest a lack either of wisdom, 
or of power, or some other perfection. He would certainly not be, nor could He 
be then the supremely Perfect Being, the Highest Good. Consequently, if it can 
be established that it is the case that some creatures, such as the non-rational 
ones, are completely unable themselves to come to their principal and final end 
directly, immediately and intellectually —since their nature lacks all intellectual 
equipment— then it must be recognized that they can and must do so mediately, 
by way of or through such other intellectual beings which do have the capacity 
to do so themselves, consciously and permanently. The recognition of this is 
called for, unless one wishes to defend irrationally that the intelligent 
35. "Deus creavit mundum ea intentione, ut amaretur et cognoscatur per crcaturam..." Ra-
mbn LLull, Liber de Prima et Secunda Intentione, c. 3, (MOG, VI, p. 540). 
36. " . . .cum Deus illas principaliter creaverit ad se ipsum, ut illarum finis sit magis nobilis". 
Llull, Liber de Anima, part 1, (MOG, VI, p. 416). 
37. "...crearet illas ad finem alterius, et non ad finem sui ipsius, quod est impossibile, et con-
tra hoc quod supra probavimus. . ." Ibid., p. 418. 
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and just design of the infinite Creator can and must come to naught . All non-
rational physical entities it must be concluded therefore, are able and indeed 
will, with all certainty, arrive at their ultimately intended destination, their 
ultimate goal. This they will do in a mediate fashion, vicariously as it were, 
through the instrumentality and in the reality of some amongst those other 
beings likewise in, and a part of, the world of matter , but which are yet 
possessed of, or endowed with, the genuinely spiritual powers of an intellec-
tual consciousness and a rational will. It will be so, because only beings of this 
latter sort in this universe of ours can be given, and have actually been given, 
the capacity, as well as the opportuni ty, to experience and possess someday 
the Highest Good immediately, consciously and permanently. It is Llull's cha-
llenging thought that these beings possessed of intellect and will have both the 
power and the task to see to it that —at the same time as they are engaged in 
the pursuit of, and at the conclusion of their lives come to the realization of, 
their own ultimate end— those other created beings, lesser than they because 
of their lack of those powers, do attain their chief and ultimate end through 
them, mediately and vicariously that is. To this task men are called as a result 
of their possession of a soul that with its intellectual powers has been given the 
opportuni ty and the capacity to achieve their goals consciously and immedia-
tely. 
The concious realization first, of the fact that every corporeal being has 
also, in its own, the Highest Good as its principal and ultimate end and se-
condly, of the truth that the Highest End cannot be directly obtained, or 
gained, save by means of activities that require the possession of the spiritual 
powers of an authentic intellect and will, could not but bring the Illuminated 
Doctor to a very lofty conclusion regarding men 's rational souls and, because 
of them, regarding the complete human beings whose essential constitutive 
parts the souls are. According to that lofty conclusion, the rational soul ap-
pears as a delegated or deputized, but still an authentic, 
means or instrument wherewith corporeal creatures, i.e. the heavens and all the 
bodies which are contained under them, are able to obtain that precise end for 
whose sake they have all been created. That end is God who created those bodies to 
serve him in this manner . 3 8 
Clearly within this understanding of the relation between what is man or 
human and what in the physical world is lesser than man , the rational part of 
man , i.e. the soul, is revealed as a spiritual substance " th rough which bodily 
38. "Anima hominis etiam est, ut sit medium et instrumentum, per quod corporales creatu-
rae, hoc est, coelum, et omnia corpora, quae illud in se continet, attingant finem, ad quem sunt 
creata, qui finis est Deus: qui illa corpora creavit ad serviendum sibi." Llull, Liber de Homine, 
part 2, (MOG, VI, p. 481). 
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substances may achieve their end in G o d " . 3 9 It cannot be thought correctly 
therefore, that rational souls —and the human beings whose principal essen-
tial principles those souls are —exist altogether simply for themselves and 
have a destiny, as it were, that is exclusively theirs and in total isolation of all 
else they find in the world, of which obviously, they are also a part . Instead, 
men with their souls stand out as beings which have a truly cosmic role and 
task, since they are the effective means for the eventual final fulfillment of the 
principal and highest goal of all non-rational reality. With more than ample 
reasons could the philosopher Llull go on to argue and point out that 
it is very appropriate that the rational soul was created and that it also possess 
these powers, so that it be the means and the instrument through which corporeal 
creatures be capable of attaining their end in God and of coming to rest in Him, 
because God created them principally for Himself, in order that their end be 
nobler . 4 0 
Or in slightly different words but with basically the same meaning: 
It is most fitting therefore, that there be in existence a spiritual substance joined 
with a human body, and to which we give the name of "rational soul" in order 
that corporeal creatures have an end wherein they may find rest. 4 ' 
Several times the philosopher, whom history has honored with the appe-
lation of the Illuminated Doctor, reminds readers of his two anthropological 
books that all non-rational beings —without excluding either those in posses-
sion of a vegetative type of life exclusively or even those with some kind of 
sensory life in addition— are incapable of reaching themselves and thereafter 
seizing, in a manner that entails permanence and consciousness, the principal 
end for the sake of which they were ultimately made to take part in the world 
of existence, at least for a brief pcriod of time. We ought not however, to at-
tribute that incapacity of theirs to some undue action on their side, for which 
they deserve to be held responsible and accountable. It all results simply from 
the fact that theirs are a nature and being which do not include, but rather ex-
clude, any authentic powers of understanding and a rational will. However, it 
39. " . . .Diximus, quod conveniat, animam rationalem esse, ut per ipsam corporales substan-
tiae attingant finem in Deo , propter quem sunt". Llull, Liber de Anima, part 1, (MOG, VI, p. 
418-9). Again, "Anima est instrumentum spirituale, cum quo corporales substantiae attingunt 
suum finem in Deo, ut jam diximus". Ibid., p. 425. 
40. "Respondemus ad hoc et dicimus, quod conveniat, animam rationalem esse creatam, et 
quod habeat illas potentias, ut ipsa sit medium et instrumemtum, per quod creaturae corporales 
possint attingere suum finem in Deo, et in illo quiescere, cum Deus illas principaliter crcaverit ad 
se ipsum, ut illarum finis sit magis nobilis". Ibid., p. 416. 
41. "Igitur convenit, quod sit substantia spiritualis conjuncta humano corpori, quam appe-
llamus animam rationalem, ut corporales creaturae habeant finem, in quo possint habere quie-
tem". Ibid., p. 417. 
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is through these alone that the Highest Good and End can, as a matter of fact, 
be attained or obtained. So it is for the simple reason that 
God is invisible, and consequently cannot be either seen, or heard or touched.. . 
Nor can (that which is only) a body recall, undertand and love God, notwithstan-
ding it is naturally in possession of an appetite and desire to serve God, for the 
sake of whose service it was created. 4 2 
Now because the same conditions apply to all non-rational reality, it is only 
reasonable to infer that one of the main reasons —although not the most prin-
cipal one in the case of them— why human souls, endowed with the power to 
carry on a truly rational life and all that follows from it, have actually been 
created, with the opportunity in their case of an endless existence, is this: that 
through them, and as a result vicariously and mediately, non-rational corpo-
real substances may have a meaningful and effective capacity to arrive at their 
u l t ima te and highest goal or end . Or in a slightly different way: 
through the souls of men, because of, and with, the human bodies those souls 
individually inform, not only has it become possible, but it is actually the case, 
that there is given in actual existence the kind of being, namely " m a n who 
himself may serve God, and that corporeal creatures may serve man and help 
him to serve G o d . " 4 3 
For men who understand the ontological and teleological relations bet-
ween man and every non-human creature in this universe of ours in the man-
ner that Ramon Llull proposed, the consequences which follow from their 
thought are significant and indeed magnificent. A first one is that man is not 
allowed to cast his glance on any portion of the large segment of the material 
universe we inhabit —the seemingly ubiquitous realm of non-rational physical 
reality— as on some item or thing that has received existence from an ultima-
tely Divine Source, to the end that unthinking rational human beings may 
wantonly destroy it, abuse it, misuse it or even simply use in any of a number 
of irrational, selfish and destructive ways. Very much to the contrary, each 
and every human being has been placed under a strict obligation to utilize 
whatever in the realms of sub- and non-human reality comes across his path in 
such a way that , through mankind in general, and by way of individual men 
specifically or in particular, the totality of material non-rational beings may 
attain as perfectly and fully as possible, even though vicariously and indi-
rectly, the principal end for whose sake it came from the hands of its Creator . 
It is so because, as it has been indicated, notwithstanding the fact and truth 
42. "Et quia Deus est invisibilis, et non potest videri, audiri nec tangi, ut supra dictum est, et 
corpus non potest recolere, intelligere et amare Deum, habens naturaliter appetitum et desiderium 
serviendi Deo, ad cujus servitum est creatum..." Llull, Liber de Homine, part 2, (MOG, VI, p. 481). 
43. " . . . ideo est anima, ut sit homo, qui serviat Deo, et ut corporales creaturae serviant homi-
ni, et ipsum juvent ad serviendum D e o . " Loc. cit. 
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that all creatures have been assigned the Highest Good as their chief and ulti-
mate end, non-rational creatures are without an inherent power to reach that 
final end themselves, consciously and permanently. Consequently, there can 
be no doubt either that a grave wrong, one that amounts to a serious injustice 
towards the Creator and in lesser measure to all nonrational substances, is 
brought about by each of the persons, specifically sinful men, " w h o deviate 
creatures from the end for the sake of which they ex is t . " 4 4 In spite of such a 
serious offense and evil which irresponsible men thus commit, the lofty ulti-
mate purpose of all non-rational creatures will definitely be satisfied, for it 
will be obtained by the whole of that non-rational creation. But it will be so 
only mediately and vicariously, through or in those persons who, as a matter 
of fact, themselves actually strive after and successfully achieve their own spe-
cific final end, the chief and absolutely ultimate end for whose sake human 
beings have also been brought into existence by the one Author of all creation. 
In order to anticipate and obviate any possible misunderstanding, it is well to 
recall here that according to authentic Christian philosophy and Christian phi-
losophers who have had a reason to express themselves on the question, " the 
ultimate end for whose sake man has been created is to remember, to know 
and to love G o d . " 4 5 
One need not read very far into the writings of the Majorcan philosopher 
to acquire some idea of the considerable esteem which he always had for the 
grandeur of man . Without ignoring or forgetting the many instances of 
wickedness and weaknesses of which he knew from personal experience and 
his observations of other men, in all ranks and places, it is clear that for him 
man was certainly " t h e noblest c rea ture" in God 's visible creat ion. 4 6 Imme-
diately after listing in one of his earliest literary and philosophical composi-
tions many of thc rcasons we have for rejoicing exceedingly over the glorious 
fact of our existence, Llull could not refrain from expressing his profound ad-
miration and gratitude to the Creator for the reason that " I see that the being 
of man is the noblest being that You have c rea ted . " 4 7 
The preceding pages have attempted to bring out some of the very significant 
thoughts expressed by Ramon Llull, in which he reveals well wherein the nobi-
44. "Et ideo male faciunt homines peccatores, qui deviant corporales creaturas a fine, prop-
ter quem sunt". Loc. cit. 
45. "Cum principalis finis, propter quem homo est creatus, sit recolere, intelligere et amare 
D e u m . . . " Ram6n Llull, Liber de Deo et Jesu Christo, prol., (MOG, VI, p. 561). 
46. "Car jassia, Senver, que hom sia la pus nobla creatura..." Llull, Librede Contemplacid, 
c. 20, 16, (ORL, II, p. 100). 
47. "Con s'esdeve que j o . . . veg que esser hom es lo pus noble esser que vos avets creat. . ." 
Ibid., c. 2, n. 10, (ORL, II, p. 12). In another of his books, completed about twenty-two years la-
ter in 1298, Llull wrote in the same vein: "Tu dedisti mihi esse, et quidem humanum esse, quod 
est optimum creatum esse, quod potest esse, excepto angelico esse . . ." Ramon Llull, Arbor Philo-
sophiae Amoris, part 5, (MOG, VI, p. 202). 
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lity of man consists. He has offered us at least two reasons to show that a deci-
dedly central position on the stage of the universe belongs to man . It is so 
first, because in the physical part of his nature with its elemental, vegetative, 
sentient and imaginative structure and powers, man exhibits so much in com-
mon with the other things comprised within the realm of physical reality. He 
thus, more than any other created entity or substance, has a quite distinct and 
definite participation in the perfections possessed by the various orders of visi-
ble or physical reality. Moreover, by reason of his spiritual rational soul, man 
reaches out beyond the stars and partakes in some measure also, of the perfec-
tions proper to spiritual reality. But then secondly and very importantly, by 
reason of his body, man , and with each man his spiritual soul, has so great a 
participation in the distinct orders of physical reality that man has been ap-
pointed to a unique and singular task. He has been deputized, because of that 
participation in, and with, all corporeal being, to act as the logical means and 
effective instrument whereby all non-rational physical substances, animate 
and inanimate, are and will be able to attain, vicariously in his body and per-
son, the highest final cause that accounts for their existence but which they 
themselves however, are incapable of achieving immediately and perma-
nently, on account of its spiritual and infinite nature and of their non-rational 
character. All things considered, it has to be said that every non-rational being 
cannot but attain the ultimate end intended for them by the Author of their 
being. They will do so, it has been noted, in and through certain human bodies 
that , al though of a physical character like them, in virtue of an entitative and 
substantial union with the rational, spiritual and immortal soul of a human 
being will have been successful in a permanent at tainment of their ultimate 
goal. For as one of the substantial principles of the reality of those human 
beings, these human bodies will also attain to the Highest Good permanently. 
Physical non-rational entities will therefore arrive at their intended end and 
rest in the Being from whom they had their origin ultimately, through crea-
tion, but only in the way in which they can do so. This wil) be in the person of 
human beings with whom they have a very close kinship as a result of a com-
mon physical makeup and constitution in the case of all of them, and of a ve-
getative and sentient nature in the case of a few of them. It can and will only 
be so because none other than beings in possession, at least partially, of a ra-
tional or intellectual nature and life can be given the capacity and the occasion 
to attain to the Highest Good immediately, consciously and permanently. 
How else might a physical and corporeal substance receive and seize at least 
imperfectly, the Highest Good, spiritual and infinite in nature , except through 
a union with, or by means of, a substance or reality spiritual in nature? Conse-
quently and evidently, the only open way for non-rational physical beings to 
arrive at the Highest Good, truly their ultimate end, is through the instrumen-
tality of what itself has, but only in a part of itself, a physical or non-rational 
character or aspect. Such an aspect clearly belongs to man but only as one of 
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two essential principles of the substantial wholeness of a metaphysically and 
physically unified single being. This substantially unified single being has a 
second essential and more important constitutive principle of its whole nature, 
for it gives to the whole and a few of its powers a definitely rational or intellec-
tual character. For that precise reason the resulting composite being, a human 
being, can itself attain to the Highest Good immediately. It also follows that 
only in, and through, the human bodies of persons who succeed in immedia-
tely obtaining their own highest and ultimate end, will non-rational creatures 
which are, or have, physical bodies achieve their principal and ultimate goal 
too . This they will do mediately and vicariously, obviously for the reasons we 
have recalled. 
From LlulFs understanding of man 's relation and kinship to the rest of 
reality, and particulary to physical reality, conclusions stressing man 's gran-
deur and the nobility of his destiny are inescapable. It cannot but be so be-
cause in regard to the rest of the physical universe —wherein man himself 
must struggle to make his own way until he reaches final fulfillment, at the 
risk on the other hand, of a total and irreversible failure— reason points out 
clearly the lofty role and task assigned to human beings in the overall scheme 
of reality. Man stands out as a noble figure who occupies a central position. 
Indeed, in a sense he stands at the center itself bf created reality in general, 
and of the large segment of physical reality more specifically. This is linked to , 
and is the result of, the heterogeneous character of his nature, for it has a 
greater share than has been given to any other created being in the perfections 
of the various orders of created being. The evidence for the truth of this last 
assertion is provided by the composite and complex nature of man. For in it 
are harmoniously united first, the seemingly contrary natures of matter and 
spirit; this in the two component parts of man 's being of which we ordinarily, 
though not very correctly, speak as " the body and the sou l " of a man. 
Secondly, we have also seen that in his own human body, in the entitative 
structure of it and in its powers, each man has a distinct participation in the 
various natures of all physical substances or bodies. For we can correctly say, 
that we find present in the body in some fashion, the elemental nature of what 
outside are simple and composite inanimate substances. Again through his 
human body, each man clearly may be said to have a share in, or to participate 
in, the vegetative nature of plants. Thirdly, because of the distinctly higher 
activities of sensory awareness and of the possession of the so-called power of 
the imagination, man also participates in the sentient nature of animals which 
at times seem to indicate simply the presence in them of rather passive sensory 
cognitive powers; but at other times, as in the case of the higher animals, with 
the presense in them of the power of the imagination, there is an even closer 
approximation to the loftier heights reached by men who are possessed of 
understanding also. All of these facts combine to establish indisputably the 
centrality of man ' s place in the created material universe. 
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The same reasons which show man ' s central position in the universe of 
which he is a part establish also clearly that the human person is a well 
designed means for the achievement by the whole of non-rational reality of its 
ultimate and highest goal or purpose. And without denying the truth that tells 
us that , not man but God, who is the Highest Good, is the absolutely ultimate 
end of all creation, a theistic thinker can, still with good reason, declare that 
man is the more immediate end of all other substances in the world, physical 
and of a non-rational nature . He can do so because all non-rational physical 
substances have been placed in the universe for the service of m a n , 4 8 in order 
that he may, in a sanely rational life, insure his own ultimate fulfillment and 
goal. In so doing, man will simultaneously and vicariously bring to perfect 
realization the highest intention which lies at the basis of the existence of these 
other physical beings. The reason why it will be so can again be briefly given in 
the words of the philosopher whose thoughts we have outlined and with which 
this paper can fittingly be brought to a close. He wrote: 
and because a rational soul is united with a human body which has a part in all 
creatures, when a soul attains to its end in God by due remembrance, understan-
ding and love, then its body attains to its end in God also. And in the body of that 
man who thus attains to his end in God through blessedness, other corporeal crea-
tures, such as are the heavenly bodies and the four substances of the world, i.e. the 
four elements with their appropriate qualities, the metals, the plants and the irra-
tional animals, shall likewise attain to their end in God through that blessed and 
glorified human b o d y . 4 9 
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48. In the Hne that follows immediately after the words from the Arbor Philosophiae Amoris 
quoted in the previous note, Llull wrote: "Et humano esse dedisti omnia corporalia ad servien-
dum ipsi, et hoc tam magnum donurh dedisti mihi in hac vita, quod non petivi a t e . . . " Loc. cit. 
49. "Et quia anima rationalis cst conjuncta humano corpori, quod participat cum omnibus 
creaturis, attingente anima suum finem in Deo per memorare, intelligere et amare, attingit corpus 
suum finem in Deo , et in corpore illius hominis, qui suum finem attingit in Deo per beatitudinem, 
attingunt aliae corporales creaturae fuum finem in Deo per illud corpus humanum beatum et glo-
rificatum, sicut corpora coelestia et quatuor substantiae mundi, videlicet quatuor elementa et illo-
rum qualitates, et metalla, plantae et animalia irrationalia". Llull, Liber de Anima, part 1, 
(MOG, VI, pp. 416-417). 
